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Abstract 
This paper outlines the concept of social citizenship, which was first theorised in the late 
1940s alongside the creation of the UK welfare state, and concerns citizens’ rights to a 
basic income and standard of living. It suggests that social citizenship – particularly 
welfare provision – is a useful and important topic for social psychological research, 
albeit one that has been largely overlooked. We provide an overview of key 
developments in social citizenship, and consider the impact of 30-plus years of 
neoliberal governance in Western democracies, which has resulted in ongoing changes 
to how welfare rights and responsibilities are configured, such as policies that make 
social citizenship rights contingent on conduct. We outline social scientific work that 
examines these shifting ideas of citizenship, personhood, welfare and conditionality, and 
make the case for a critical discursive psychological approach, which we illustrate with a 
brief empirical example. We suggest that critical discursive social psychology is 
particularly well placed to examine how psychological assumptions are built into both 
policy and lay discourse, and how these can legitimate interventions designed to work 
on the conduct of the unemployed, such as therapeutic and behaviour change initiatives. 
Finally, we argue that psychology is faced with a choice: while there are opportunities 
for the discipline to contribute to the design and implementation of such initiatives, to do 
so requires accepting the basic values of the underpinning neoliberal agenda. Instead, it 
is vital to place these assumptions under the critical microscope and explore how they 
work to obscure structural disadvantage. 
 
Keywords: Citizenship, Discursive psychology, Neoliberalism, Social citizenship, 
Welfare  
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In the past 20 years, social psychology has increasingly engaged with citizenship as a 
topic, contributing useful insights into how people both understand and perform 
citizenship in various contexts. However, such approaches have largely concentrated 
on political and civil citizenship, overlooking the social dimension (Gibson, Crossland 
& Hamilton, 2018). This paper makes the case for social citizenship as a useful and 
important topic for social psychological research, and outlines work done in this area 
to date from outside the discipline. Given the increasing moves towards the 
psychologization of welfare and social citizenship, we argue that a social psychological 
approach based on critical discursive psychology has a particularly important 
contribution to make. The increasing prominence of welfare policies that emphasise 
individual behaviour, and which make social citizenship rights contingent on 
‘normative’ conduct, offers opportunities for social psychologists who are willing to 
embrace agendas such as behaviour change, and the broader set of neoliberal values 
which underpin these (Cromby & Willis, 2013; Thomas, 2016). By contrast, we will 
suggest that a critical discursive social psychology should place these agendas and 
values under the critical microscope, and highlight the contingent way in which 
psychological assumptions are built into both policy and lay discourse. 
 To begin with we will provide an overview of key developments in social 
citizenship, before moving on to outline the potential of an approach influenced by 
critical discursive psychology, which we will illustrate by way of a brief empirical 
example. Our discussion focuses on the UK context, but the general issues raised 
around psychologization can, in principle, be explored in relation to other cultural 
contexts, particularly given the extent to which similar trends in the development of 
social citizenship can be identified elsewhere (Handler, 2004; Humpage, 2014; 2015; 
Peck & Tickell, 2002). 
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What is social citizenship? 
Citizenship in general, and social citizenship more particularly, is a contested idea and 
an agreed definition is elusive if not impossible (Condor, 2011; Dwyer, 2000). At its 
most basic, citizenship is concerned with the relationship between individuals and the 
communities they live in, particularly the state.  
Conceptualisations of social citizenship are widely recognised as being based 
on principles developed from T.H. Marshall’s (1950/1992) seminal 1949 lecture 
‘Citizenship and Social Class’, where he first outlined three interrelated dimensions of 
citizenship: civil, political and social. The civil dimension of citizenship concerns 
rights to individual freedom (e.g. freedom of speech), the political dimension involves 
rights to political participation (e.g. voting), and the social dimension involves rights to 
a basic standard of living (e.g. a basic income). Marshall proposed that these forms of 







respectively, alongside major changes in social institutions and the material conditions 
of people’s lives (Dwyer, 2000; Humpage, 2014). For example, the US ‘welfare state’ 
was instigated in the 1930s in response to the miseries of the Great Depression, which 
was caused by stock market gambling and an unfettered free market economy (Yergin 
& Stanislaw, 2002).  Similarly, Marshall’s ideas took shape at the beginning of what 
we now know as the ‘welfare state’ in the UK, the creation of which was instigated by 
the Beveridge report of 1942. Between 1944 and 1948 laws were passed to raise the 
school leaving age to 15, create the National Health Service, and to expand national 
insurance. These reforms were underpinned by Keynesian economics, a radical new 
approach that promoted increased state spending as the best way to keep the economy 
afloat as well as improve citizens’ living conditions in terms of rights to education, 
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health, housing and relief from the effects of unemployment (Revi, 2014). Marshall 
(1950/1992) argued that these rights were necessary to facilitate full participation in 
society, and to transcend the inequalities associated with capitalism and class structure, 
by emphasising equality of status and opportunity. Marshall’s idea of citizenship can 
be usefully seen as an attempt to fuse ideas associated with liberal and communitarian 
forms of citizenship. Liberalism, speaking generally, involves a conceptualisation of 
citizenship as a status or set of rights that does not have to be ‘earned’, while 
communitarianism conceives of it as a responsibility, involving contribution and virtue. 
Marshall’s idea involves an attempt to combine the emphasis on individualism inherent 
in liberalism with the encouragement of community coherence found in the 
communitarian tradition (Dwyer, 2010).  
Marshall’s concept of social citizenship has attracted criticism, most commonly 
for being based on an outdated, exclusionary, Anglocentric, white, able-bodied, 
middle-class, male model. Feminist criticism of his work argues that it denies women 
substantive citizenship status as they are frequently engaged in unpaid ‘caring’ work in 
private rather than paid ‘public’ work (Lister, 1998; Morris, 1994; Young, 1989). It has 
also been problematized in terms of inclusion/exclusion for other groups, such as 
people with a disability (Oliver & Barnes, 2012), ethnic minorities (Dahrendorf, 1988) 
and people with a mental health diagnosis (Sayce, 2000). Dwyer (2000) argues that 
Marshall wrongly assumes a set of universal values shared by everyone in a 
community, evidenced by his statement that: ‘Inequalities can be tolerated within a 
fundamentally egalitarian society’ (Marshall, 1950/1992, p.44).  
Lister (1998) argued that although this ‘false universalism’ of social citizenship 
was intended as a force for inclusion, it actually works to further exclude marginalised 
groups in practice. Both the liberal and communitarian traditions construct the citizen 
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as an abstract, disembodied individual, which serves to mask the degree to which 
‘otherness’ – being female, black, disabled or poor – can exclude people from enjoying 
full citizenship (Lister, 1998).  
Marshall’s (1950/1992) attempt to isolate the social element of citizenship from 
its political and economic context has also been criticised, as individuals and society 
coexist interdependently (Dwyer, 2000; Lister, 1998; Oliver & Heater, 1994). 
Arguments for alternative ideas of citizenship have been proposed, such as economic 
citizenship – the right to work and responsibility to pay tax (Kessler-Harris, 2003); 
cultural citizenship, which involves rights related to language and sense-making 
(Turner, 1993); biological citizenship (Rose, 2009) and, in response to contemporary 
concerns, European, ecological and global citizenship (e.g. Dean, 2014; van 
Steenbergen, 1994). Such fragmentation carries the danger of citizenship collapsing 
into a confusion of overlapping strands (Bulmer & Rees, 1996).  
Marshall’s theorisation of the emergence of social citizenship has also attracted 
criticism, with Dean (2014) pointing out that the progression from civil to political and 
finally to social rights does not apply straightforwardly.  Even within the same state, 
variations may be observed in the way in which rights were granted to different groups, 
such as the delayed granting of political rights to women. However, most scholars 
accept Marshall’s account of what social citizenship actually consists of. His 
description of social citizenship rights as those which allow people to “live the life of a 
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (1992, p.8) 
acknowledges that the normative expectations of what constitutes a basic level of 
welfare and security will vary between societies and over time. Marshall’s account of 
social citizenship, then, is flexible enough to allow an examination of the constantly 
changing, highly contested nature of how rights and needs are defined and met, which 
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particular rights and responsibilities may be privileged or contested in different 
contexts, and on what grounds.  
Marshall’s work maintains its status as the foundational text for studies of 
citizenship and social policy, and continues to inform social scientific approaches to 
citizenship (e.g. Dean & Melrose, 1999; Dwyer, 2000; Condor 2011; Gibson, 2009; 
2011; Oliver and Heater, 1994; Roche, 1992; Turner, 1993). It has also been argued 
that social citizenship can supply a useful benchmark against which to measure the 
relative status of groups and individuals, and allow for the exploration of social 
divisions in a way that factors in other complex dimensions such as gender, class, 
disability and race (Dean 2004; Dwyer, 2010). However, the welfare state as Marshall 
knew it has seen enormous change in 30-plus years of neoliberal policies, which 
undermine many of the fundamental principles of social citizenship. In this context, 
Isin (2008) argued that it is vital to revisit social citizenship in the wake of 
neoliberalism, which has resulted in important ongoing changes in how the rights and 
responsibilities of social citizenship are configured. 
 
Social citizenship and neoliberalism 
The concept of neoliberalism has been criticised as overly vague, with different 
meanings that can be deployed for varying purposes (Dunn, 2017; Springer, 2012). 
However, as Cahill and Konings (2017) argue, it can serve as an entry point for 
examining contemporary political economy, and a recent definition by Peck, Brenner 
and Theodore (2018, p. 6) is useful for our purposes: “the ideology of neoliberalism is 
founded on an idealized vision of market rule and liberal freedoms, combining a 
utilitarian conception of market rationality and competitive individualism with deep 
antipathies to social redistribution and solidarity.” The application of free-market 
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values to areas of life that had not hitherto been conceptualised in terms of market 
forces has led to the ‘responsibilisation’ of individual citizens (Clarke, 2005). 
McGuigan (2016, p.117), among others, has argued that it has also impacted 
subjectivity by constructing a ‘preferred self’ of an enterprising, autonomous consumer.  
Neoliberalism started to gain traction in Western industrialised nations from the 
1970s onwards, when major economic changes such as rising unemployment, 
increasing inflation, more women in the workforce and globalisation led to the 
abandonment of Keynesian economics (Handler, 2004). There are debates about which 
factors were most influential in the cutbacks to the British welfare state from the late 
1970s onwards, but Huber and Stephens (2001) suggest it was the high rate of 
unemployment and the accompanying realisation that this would be permanent. As 
Marshall’s model of social rights was based on the assumption of full employment, it 
has been suggested that social citizenship has been in crisis since that time (Dean & 
Melrose, 1999). However, many social scientists have used welfare – specifically the 
areas of provision, conditionality and membership – as a terrain to explore changing 
ideas about social citizenship (e.g. Dean, 2000; Dean & Melrose, 1999; Dwyer, 2000; 
2004; 2010; Dwyer & Wright, 2014; Humpage, 2014; 2015; Taylor-Gooby, 2000; 
2009; 2015). For example, accompanying the radical economic changes made by the 
Conservative government of the 1980s and 1990s (de-industrialisation, shifting 
production overseas and deregulation of the financial industry) was a construction of 
the ‘active citizen’ who is individually and socially responsible. Conditionality around 
social rights became increasingly important in this era, and the idea of ‘benefits 
dependency’ and the ‘underclass’ – a term referring to socially excluded citizens – 
started to grow (Deacon, 1994; Dean & Taylor-Gooby, 1992). 
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The New Labour government of 1997 ushered in ‘Third Way’ politics, 
characterised by four key themes: emphasising the centrality of paid work; 
downplaying Labour’s traditional focus on redistribution of income in favour of 
equality of opportunities; constructing the welfare state as active and preventative; and 
the balancing of rights with responsibilities (Powell, 1999). This was heavily 
influenced by the work of sociologist Anthony Giddens (1999), who argued for a new 
relationship between the individual and the community in which ‘no rights without 
responsibilities’ became the ‘prime motto’ (1999, p.66). In this era, Clarke (2005) 
argues, citizens were reframed as ‘empowered, activated and responsibilised’ (2005, 
p.447), reflecting the shift from thinking it is the government’s responsibility to ensure 
full employment to the idea that individuals bear the main responsibility to find and 
keep work. As a result, poverty and unemployment became more stigmatised (Clarke, 
2005; Lister, 2002) and citizens were no longer seen as the bearers of rights but as 
consumers (Clarke, 2005; Humpage, 2014). As Tuffin, Morgan, Frewin and Jardine 
(2000) have argued, neoliberalism individualizes risk factors such as illness, poverty 
and unemployment. 
This trend continued under the Coalition government of 2010 and the 
Conservative administrations of 2015 and 2017, particularly in the area of what Taylor-
Gooby (2015) calls ‘new social risks’ (NSR) – services for low-income people, such as 
jobseekers’ allowance
1
, tax credits and housing benefit. He argues that by targeting 
NSR services for dramatic cuts, despite them costing less (around 5 to 6% of GDP 
compared to 25% for ‘old social risk’ (OSR) services, which incorporate healthcare, 
pensions, education and disability benefits), the government has disproportionately 
affected women, children and low-paid people and created an increasing divide 
between provision of OSR and NSR services, with the latter being highly moralised by 
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political and media discourses. Taylor-Gooby (2015) regards NSR as having become 
central to the debate on the future of the welfare state, as public attitudes towards 
people claiming unemployment or disability benefit or people on low incomes are 
increasingly unsympathetic.  
These changes were justified with reference to long-standing ideas concerning 
the creation of a dependency culture (e.g. Dean & Taylor-Gooby, 1992).  For example, 
Prime Minister David Cameron introduced the 2011 Welfare Reform Bill with a 
speech which emphasised that, ‘The benefit system has created a benefit culture. It 
doesn’t just allow people to act irresponsibly, but often actively encourages them to do 
so’ (2011, p.1). In this reckoning, the safety net provided for people who are unable to 
work or find employment is reframed as actively contributing to unemployment and 
creating ‘irresponsible’ behaviour. Controversially, Perkins (2016) advanced this 
argument to an epigenetic level, outlining his theory that state benefits actively lead to 
an ‘employment resistant’ personality, and calling for reduced welfare payments to 
discourage un- or underemployed families from having children. 
These years of reforms have been theorised by Peck and Tickell (2002) as two 
distinct periods of neoliberal policies, the ‘destructive’ roll-back years (1979 to 1999), 
where Keynesian social-collectivist institutions were discredited and destroyed, and the 
subsequent roll-out period, when neoliberal modes of governance were constructed and 
consolidated. Humpage (2014) suggests an addition of the roll-over ‘normalising’ 
period of neoliberalism, which resulted from the financial crash of 2007-2008 in which 
public attitudes were seen to fall in line with neoliberal agendas in some – but not all – 
policy areas. The result of these phases of neoliberalism is that social citizenship rights 
have become increasingly conditional on conduct, with paid employment being the key 
citizenship marker (Clarke, 2005; Humpage, 2014; Lister, 2002; Wiggan, 2012). Those 
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excluded from membership have been constructed as deficient and in need of 
rectification. This conditionality around welfare is now expanding to encompass 
disciplinary practices aimed at modifying psychological properties such as attitudes 
and personality traits (Friedli & Stearn, 2015).  
The discipline of psychology is thus faced with a choice. Making citizenship 
contingent on conduct opens up possibilities for the discipline to contribute to 
initiatives aimed at monitoring and altering behaviour, yet to do so requires the 
acceptance of the basic premises of the underpinning neoliberal agenda. An alternative 
approach is to place these psychological assumptions under the critical microscope and 
to explore how they are woven into both the policies themselves and the more diffuse 
set of commonplace assumptions about social citizenship. 
 
Overview of social citizenship research 
Examining the dominant ideologies that shape these shifting ideas of personhood, 
citizenship, welfare and conditionality is essential. However, there is only a small body 
of empirical work that explores how the grand narratives of individualism and 
neoliberalism might appear in everyday discourse and what the implications of this are 
for how we make sense of ourselves and others. Most of this work has been done by 
academics in the fields of sociology, political science and social policy (For overviews 
see: Dean & Melrose, 1999; Dwyer, 2010; Humpage, 2014), much of it focusing on 
tracking public attitudes about welfare provision and conditionality using questionnaire 
data derived from closed questions. In a recent example, Humpage (2014) investigated 
citizens’ attitudes to neoliberal policies using data from public attitude surveys and 
case studies from different Western countries. While early neoliberal reforms generally 
created an outcry and led to policy reversals in some areas, she found that this public 
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resistance lessened in the late 2000s, concluding that neoliberalism has shaped social 
values. Attitudes to social security and, to a lesser extent, redistribution, have hardened 
over time in all the countries.  
Large-scale survey analyses have been complemented by qualitative research 
that has explored people’s commonsense reasoning about matters of welfare and social 
citizenship. For example, Dwyer (2000) and Dean (2004; Dean & Melrose, 1999) have 
analysed interview and focus group data about welfare in the UK – specifically issues 
around conditionality and membership. This work has highlighted the extent to which 
ordinary discourse around welfare draws on competing ideas about social citizenship. 
However, rather than exploring how these tensions are debated and resolved by 
participants themselves, researchers have noted that ‘popular discourse is usually 
chaotic and often contradictory’ (Dean, 2004, p. 68), and attempted to reconstruct a 
more consistent position for their participants. 
However, we suggest that these analytical assumptions and conclusions are 
open to question in terms of how they interpret the conflicting discourses of citizenship 
drawn on by participants. As Gibson (2011) argued, important aspects of human 
discursive consciousness are overlooked by theorising individuals as rational actors 
with internal consistency of mind, who take up or resist one of a number of available 
discourses. Rather than taking the presence of competing ideological themes as an 
indication of confusion and contradiction, and/or as a methodological problem to be 
overcome, Gibson argued for an approach informed by the ideological dilemmas 
perspective (Billig et al., 1988).  This perspective theorises human thought as informed 
and enabled by contradictory discourses, and highlights the inherently dilemmatic 
nature of citizenship ideology (Condor & Gibson, 2007; Gibson, 2011).  Rather than 
‘subscribing’ to a single ideological position, we should expect to find that people in 
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their everyday reasoning and action draw on the competing themes of 
formal/intellectual ideologies. 
This approach highlights the virtue of looking at what people are doing when 
they use conflicting ideologies of citizenship, such as the negotiation of one’s own 
identity as a ‘good’ or ‘successful’ (as opposed to ‘bad’ or ‘failing’) citizen, and the 
construction of such identities for others (Clarke, 2005; McAvoy, 2009; Walkerdine, 
2003). These insights have been developed most clearly by critical discursive 
psychologists, and whilst citizenship has not typically been a core concern within 
social psychology, the analytic lens of critical discursive psychology has recently 
begun to be used to explore the construction of citizenship and citizen identities. 
 
A critical discursive social psychological approach to social citizenship 
The small but growing engagement with citizenship in social psychology (for 
overviews, see Andreouli, 2019; Condor, 2011; Stevenson, Dixon, Hopkins, & Luyt, 
2015; Xenitidou & Sapountzis, 2018), has, to date, paid relatively little attention to 
social citizenship. This is an interesting gap in the literature and one potential reason 
could be the academic division between sociology and psychology that arose in the 
early 20
th
 century, which Stenner and Taylor (2008) argue resulted in sociology 
focusing on the social project of welfare, and psychology on individual ‘wellbeing’. 
They call instead for a ‘psychosocial’ approach to welfare that merges the two, as the 
welfare state plays a fundamental role in constructing human subjectivity, and 
wellbeing cannot be fully considered outside the context of welfare. Indeed, as noted 
above, the discipline of psychology has become increasingly influential in informing 
welfare policies that now shape social citizenship rights and responsibilities. Recent 
examples in the UK include the ‘behavioural change’ initiatives used by government 
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social service contractors (Jones, Whitehead, & Pykett, 2011; Friedli & Stearn, 2015), 
the much-heralded rolling out of the Increasing Access to Psychological Therapies 
(IAPT) initiative (Department of Health and Social Care, 2007), offering free online 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) courses to jobseekers (HM Treasury, 2015), and 
the use of obligatory psychometric testing developed by positive psychologists in the 
US to ‘nudge’ benefits claimants into adopting attitudes that conform to neoliberal 
values, such as flexibility, independence, enterprise, competitiveness and individuality 
(Cromby & Willis, 2013).  
We suggest that a critical discursive perspective is well placed to explore these 
matters. As Wetherell (1996) suggests, it makes little sense to theorise the individual 
outside of the social: ‘In talking, people are constituting their social realities and 
collective cultures, manufacturing and constructing their lives, and are themselves 
manufactured as personalities and subjects in the process.’ (1996, p. 281). The way we 
conceptualise the ‘self’ varies between cultures and over time, and Foucault (1976) 
accounts for this variation by showing how practices of the self are intimately tied to 
structures of power. The notion of ‘governmentality’ grew out of Foucault’s ideas 
about power, and refers to the network of ideas, strategies and mechanisms through 
which various authorities (e.g. medical, governmental, economic) seek to act on the 
lives and behaviours of people (Rose, 1996). Discourses work to construct these 
regimes of knowledge and associated understandings of the world, and by actively 
operating within them, we come to understand ourselves and our social world in a 
particular way (McAvoy, 2009). However, this is not to suggest that people are simply 
the passive recipients of ideology. As Foucault (1984) suggested, discourses can also 
be potential sites for debate, resistance and alternative conceptions of ‘reality’, and 
Billig et al. (1988) contend that wrestling with the dilemmas conferred by competing 
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ideologies is a fundamental part of human thinking. However, analyses of this process 
in relation to social citizenship ideologies are rare, and there is thus limited exploration 
of how potentially competing ideological themes are reconciled and reproduced in 
discursive practice. 
As we have seen, there is now a dominant neoliberal vocabulary with terms like 
autonomy, choice, responsibility and enterprise given a high political value. This 
works to impose a moral obligation on individuals to draw from the resources of the 
self, rather than the group or state (Andrade, 2014; Foucault, 1973; 1976; Miller, 1986; 
Rose, 1996). However, despite the growing body of work on governmentality and the 
small amount of social psychological work on social citizenship, there has been no 
explicit link made between the two that investigates how our understandings of social 
citizenship rights and responsibilities are shaped by current ideas about self and society. 
As Andreouli (2019) argues, analyses of citizenship often lack such a focus on 
everyday perspectives and practices of citizenship. 
A critical discursive psychological approach to social citizenship is able to 
investigate the socially shared discursive resources that people use to talk about and 
make sense of their lives in relation to citizenship, welfare and conditionality. Certain 
constructions are generally more readily drawn on than others, indicating a cultural 
dominance of certain ways of seeing the world at any one time, and an associated 
moral hierarchy – what or who is seen as valued, and what or who is not (Edley, 2001). 
It also looks at discursive practices – what actions are carried out with talk around 
welfare rights and responsibilities. As our arguments are shaped by the material 
conditions of our lives and personal histories, as well as wider societal influences, this 
approach allows for a rich exploration that can also incorporate other complex factors 
such as class, gender, culture, ethnicity and even health status (McAvoy, 2009). Of the 
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small amount of discursive social psychological research that explicitly deals with 
social citizenship as a topic, Gibson, Crossland and Hamilton (2018) focus on the 
intersection of social citizenship and immigration. In their analysis of online comments 
about immigration, they found that issues around welfare were often invoked and a 
repertoire of ‘effortfulness’ was frequently used to negotiate debates about who was or 
wasn’t entitled to the status of full, competent citizen. Among the findings, the 
researchers identified a lay version of the ‘dependency culture’ argument (Dean & 
Taylor-Gooby, 1992; Wiggan, 2012) whereby people used the psychological constructs 
of laziness and unreliability to position a sub-group of British people as lacking the 
necessary psychological or moral resources in comparison to ‘hard-working’ 
immigrants. This builds on earlier work by Gibson (2009, 2011) who found 
‘effortfulness’ to be frequently invoked when people were grappling with the dilemma 
between welfare as a citizenship right and the responsibility to contribute to society, 
reflecting the tensions between liberal and communitarian ideologies inherent in 
citizenship. As well as being used by policymakers, assumptions about the 
psychological can therefore be used to perform social actions in everyday discourse. 
Similarly, in an analysis of interviews with officials responsible for the 
administration of applications for British citizenship, Andreouli and Dashtipour (2014) 
found contrasting ideas being drawn upon simultaneously. Specifically, participants 
could emphasise fairness for UK inhabitants on the one hand, versus the moral 
imperative to show compassion to asylum seekers on the other. These dilemmas were 
negotiated with a discourse of ‘earned’ citizenship – those deemed deserving were 
those who ‘put back into society’ (p. 106) through economic work and by fulfilling the 
moral obligation to be ‘proud’ of their new British citizenship.   
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Discursive analyses of media discourses and policy documents are also a 
fruitful area of social citizenship research, although they are often not explicitly framed 
as such. For example, Wiggan’s (2012) analysis of the UK government’s 2010 Green 
and White Papers on welfare reform found three linked themes: ‘worklessness’, which, 
he argues, serves to pathologise a lack of paid employment as both an individual 
failing and a societal phenomenon to be addressed; a ‘culture of dependency’ 
preventing people from taking up available work; and the rationality and necessity for 
punitive measures to reform welfare. More recently Goodman and Carr (2017) looked 
at how people involved in televised discussions concerning welfare mobilised 
discursive resources to frame arguments about entitlement to benefits. They found that 
people often drew on competing arguments that the world is both just and unjust, and 
that they frequently used just world arguments to legitimate social inequalities. 
Such research is important in showing that citizenship identities are fluid and 
context-dependent, and draw on different ideologies of citizenship (Xenitidou & 
Sapountzis, 2018). By looking at how rights and duties are established and contested, it 
is possible to see what is achieved at an individual, relational and institutional level 
when ideas such as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ are used. The critical discursive 
approach also allows for an exploration of how subjectivities are constructed – how we 
understand ourselves as individuals – which, again, has an important contribution to 
make to the study of citizenship. In order to illustrate the potential contribution of this 
approach in more detail, we will conclude with an empirical example. 
 
‘People who can’t be bothered’: Using effort to resolve an ideological dilemma 
As outlined by Wetherell (1998), critical discursive social psychology draws on 
multiple traditions in the analysis of discourse, ranging from the detailed micro-
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 18 
 
interactional approach of conversation analysis (CA), to broader-brushed perspectives 
such as post-structuralism.  In doing so, the aim is to avoid sweeping generalisations 
about ‘discourses’ by ensuring that analytic claims are warranted through reference to 
specific empirical examples of discourse.  However, critical discursive social 
psychology goes beyond the local interactional focus of CA by seeking to connect talk 
with culture, ideology and history (Wetherell, 2003).  There are, inevitably, tensions in 
any such project, but the ultimate aim is to work with an approach that draws together 
the insights of multiple perspectives, and in doing so is greater than the sum of its parts. 
To illustrate this in relation to social citizenship, we will consider an example 
from a study of young people’s citizenship talk in which a sample of 14-16 year-olds 
took part in group interviews which covered a number of topics related to citizenship 
(for more details, see Gibson, 2011, 2015; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011, 2013). The 
following extract is from an interview with two 15-year-old female participants, who 
were given the pseudonyms Jo and Kelly, and is taken from a part of the interview in 




1 I: Yeah (.) okay. Erm (.) and do you think everyone should 
2  work? 
3 Jo: Yeah cos I think it’s like- 
4 Kelly: Yeah. I think it’s bet- it’s better for like- 
5 Jo: Everyone has their chances so I think they should take 
6  that opportunity to like make their own money (.) and like 
7  make their own way in life (.) rather than like living off (.) I 
8  don’t know. It sounds really harsh ((laughs)) but like 
9  living off benefit or whatever. 
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10 I: No (.) that’s fine. Erm (.) what about people who don’t have 
11  a job? What do you think about them? Do you think 
12  that they should – obviously you said benefits (.) do you 
13  think that they should be allowed support? 
14 Jo: Well (.) yeah (.) but I think they should be able to like- 
15 Kelly: If- if they have got something wrong with them which 
16  means that they cannot physically work- 
17 Jo: [Yeah (.) yeah.] 
18 I: [Like disability?] 
19 Jo: Yeah (.) then I can understand them getting benefits 
20  [but if it’s just people]= 
21 Kelly: [Yeah definitely.] 
22 Jo: =who can’t be bothered to like (.) get up and work. 
23 Kelly: Yeah (.) who are too lazy like. 
24 Jo: Yeah. 
25 Kelly: I think that’s really wrong. 
 
Here we see what Gibson (2009) described as the effortfulness repertoire being used to 
construct a rhetorical bottom-line (Potter, 1996) in arguments concerning who should 
and who should not be entitled to receive welfare benefits. In these interviews, terms 
such as ‘laziness’ and references to people who ‘can’t be bothered’ were used to hold 
people accountable for their employment status, and concomitantly to characterise 
undeserving cases for the receipt of unemployment benefits. After a couple of false 
starts (lines 3-4), Jo takes the floor in response to the interviewer’s question concerning 
the responsibility/obligation to work, and draws on norms of equal opportunities (lines 
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5: Everyone has their chances) and the desirability of self-sufficiency (line 6-7: make 
their own money … make their own way in life). When it comes to formulating the 
object of unfavourable contrast with self-sufficiency, Jo’s talk shows features 
commonly observed in talk about ‘delicate’ issues (e.g. van Dijk, 1984). After marking 
the beginning of the contrast she does not complete her utterance, instead disclaiming 
knowledge (line 7: rather than like living off, I don’t know). Several authors have 
pointed out that the use of ‘I don’t know’ performs important discursive business in 
‘delicate’ talk (e.g. Edwards, 1995; Potter, 2004). As Wooffitt (2005, p. 121) suggests, 
such formulations ‘can be used by speakers to display their uninterest in, or distance 
from, claims, opinions or descriptions which are in some way sensitive, or which may 
be taken as the basis for sceptical or negative inferences about them.’ The meta-
discursive comment on line 8 (sounds really harsh) functions to anticipate, and thereby 
to inoculate against, the subsequent utterance (and note the extreme case formulation 
[Pomerantz, 1986] really here). This is followed immediately by another indication of 
the sensitive nature of the topic – a short burst of laughter (Jefferson, 1984). When the 
phrase ‘living off benefit’ is eventually produced, it is done in such a way as to present 
it as being an example of a range of unspecified possible alternatives. The use of ‘like’ 
serves to distance Jo from the exact phrase ‘living off benefit’, and ‘or whatever’ 
performs similar work to what Jefferson (1990) has termed generalized list completers, 
in that it implies alternatives without the need to specify what these might be. 
 The interviewer’s subsequent response (line 10: No, that’s fine) orients to the 
markers of delicacy apparent in Jo’s talk. Rather than immediately posing a challenge 
or providing a counter-argument, the interviewer instead orients to Jo as requiring 
reassurance that she may say things which sound ‘really harsh’. Nevertheless, the 
interviewer does pursue Jo’s reference to ‘benefits’ (lines 10-13), and after Jo begins to 
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respond but fails to complete her utterance, Kelly’s turn on lines 15-16 begins the joint 
production of two contrasting if-then conditional statements which unpack the category 
of people who are ‘living off benefit’ by offering two contrasting script formulations 
(Edwards, 1995) for judging the legitimacy of benefit claimants. Kelly constructs a 
category of people who ‘have got something wrong with them which means that they 
cannot physically work’, which is glossed as ‘disability’ by the interviewer. Jo takes 
over on line 19 to produce the then component of the first conditional statement (then I 
can understand them getting benefits) and, on lines 20-22, produces the if component 
of the second conditional statement (but if it’s just people who can’t be bothered to like, 
get up and work). The use of just (see Lee, 1987) functions as an extreme case 
formulation here insofar as it constructs a category of people whose sole reason for not 
working is that they ‘can’t be bothered’. Also of note here is the use of the phrase ‘get 
up’, which implies that people are sat down or lying down and that not only can they 
‘not be bothered’ to work, they cannot even be ‘bothered’ to raise themselves to their 
feet. The implications of this are made clear by Kelly when she glosses these people as 
‘too lazy’ (line 23), before going on to complete the conditional statement (albeit 
without explicit use of then) on line 25 in the form of an evaluative statement, again 
articulated through the use of an ECF, of such people’s claims to receive benefit (I 
think that’s really wrong). 
 Of particular interest here is the way in which the terms ‘can’t be bothered’ and 
‘lazy’ function to apportion accountability in such a way as to avoid the problems 
which Jo encountered with her initial reference to people ‘living off benefit’. Once 
they begin to unpack this category into legitimate and illegitimate benefit claimants, Jo 
and Kelly construct versions of canonical deserving and undeserving cases. Deserving 
cases are defined by their physical abilities (they cannot physically work), whereas the 
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undeserving cases are defined by their psychology – they are lazy and ‘can’t be 
bothered to … get up and work’. In the former case individuals are not accountable for 
their situation and are thus entitled to support, whereas in the latter case individuals are 
held accountable and are thus not entitled to support.  
 We may note how these arguments parallel the assumptions of wider neoliberal 
discourses concerning welfare, and that the shifting cultural norms identified by 
authors such as Humpage (2014) are effectively drawn upon by these speakers in order 
to manage the delicate business of not seeming to appear too ‘harsh’.  Thus the 
participants in this example not only assume the existence of a category of people who 
‘can’t be bothered to … get up and work’, but are also able to invoke this category in 
order to manage the interpersonal business of self-presentation in the local context of 
the interview setting.  This can be understood as an example of Latour’s (1987) idea of 
blackboxing in which the factual status of some object or phenomenon is so taken for 
granted that it is able to be deployed in the pursuit of other ends.  Here, those other 
ends are the management of a dilemma between the responsibility to reward effort, and 
the requirement to display compassion for those who have fallen on hard times.  The 
straightforward mobilization of a category of persons characterized by their 
psychology exemplifies the extent to which this has become part of everyday 
commonsense beyond the language of policymakers. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Social citizenship has been the focus of much work in social policy, with 
analysts highlighting the extent to which social rights have increasingly come to be 
made contingent on conduct. As Rose (2000, p. 1406) has argued, in neoliberal 
regimes, welfare recipients have increasingly come to be ‘characterized as failures, 
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lacking personal skills and competencies’. Yet this focus on the broad sweep of policy 
has only rarely been matched by an attention to ordinary discourse. A perspective 
informed by critical discursive psychology enables us to see how people draw on the 
psychologised tropes of neoliberalism in order to manage dilemmas of commonsense. 
The psychological criterion of effort is mobilised in order to resolve a dilemma 
between the responsibility to contribute and the right to receive welfare payments 
when one is not able to contribute through no fault of one’s own. Yet in drawing on 
psychologised understandings of welfare, not only are individualised explanations of 
unemployment and poverty assumed, but so the idea that people should be held 
accountable for their psychology is reproduced. In the absence of physical disability, 
people should be able to make an effort. If they cannot do this, then they can indeed be 
‘characterized as failures’ and held to account. Such everyday ideologies underpin and 
legitimate a range of interventions designed to work on the conduct of the unemployed, 
such as the therapeutic and behaviour change initiatives described above. In a context 
which prioritises research ‘impact’, psychology – and psychologists – can see this as 
an opportunity and contribute to the design and delivery of such interventions. Yet this 
would be to neglect the structural disadvantage that is obscured by the focus on 
psychologised understandings of welfare. In developing a social psychology of social 
citizenship, we therefore need to go beyond psychology in order not to lose sight of the 
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1
 Jobseekers’ allowance is the benefit paid to unemployed people, provided that they can meet certain 
requirements around seeking employment.  Indeed, the very name jobseekers’ allowance makes clear 
that the payment is for people actively seeking employment. 
2
 Transcription notation is based on Jefferson’s (2004) conventions.  A full stop in single parentheses 
indicates a brief pause; square brackets indicates talk in overlap; comments enclosed in double 
parentheses indicates comments from the transcriber; a question mark indicates questioning intonation, 
rather than a grammatical question as such; a full stop indicates stopping intonation; a dash indicates a 
sharp cut-off of the preceding sound; equals signs indicates that one turn latches onto the end of the 
previous turn. 
